Pricing research and development services in the USSR by Bornstein, Morris
85 
Pricing research and development services in 
the USSR * 
Morris BORNSTEIN 
Depurtment of Economtcs, The Unioersit~c of Michigan. Ann Arbor, MI 48109. USA 
Final version received October 1983 
Most Soviet applied research and development (R&D) is 
performed by organizations of industrial branch ministries. 
Pricing of applied R&D begins with calculations of costs. 
which are often inflated. Soviet specialists disagree on whether 
R&D prices should include a profit above cost, and, if so, how 
the profit should be determined. Current pricing schemes for 
applied R&D include profits based on planned wage cost, on 
planned total cost, or on the economic effect of the R&D. 
The use of the last pricing method is analyzed and evaluated 
in detail. In principle this method creates incentives for timely 
delivery of high quality R&D results suitable for assimilation 
into production. However, in practice the strength of these 
incentives is considerably weakened by a number of factors. 
1. Introduction 
In the USSR prices for research and develop- 
ment (R&D) services are used in the stages of 
applied research and development. The earlier 
stage of fundamental research is not expected to 
generate a practical result that can be priced, while 
the later innovation stage is supposed to yield 
mass production of new products to be sold at 
industrial wholesale prices. 
Of total Soviet applied R&D, 90-95 percent is 
performed by research institutes, design bureaus, 
and other organizations of industrial branch 
ministries, and 5-10 percent by units of academies 
of sciences or higher educational institutions [33, 
pp. 3-4 and 43-461. 
* 
Applied R&D is arranged through a contract 
The author wishes to thank the National Council for Soviet 
and East European Research for financial support for this 
study; the International Research and Exchanges Board for 
aid on a research trip to Eastern Europe; John Attarian for 
his assistance in research; and three anonymous referees for 
this journal for their helpful suggestions. 
Research Policy 13 (1984) 85-100 
North-Holland 
between the R&D unit and an enterprise (or a 
work-order from the branch ministry to the R&D 
organization). ’ R&D contracts are not usually 
the result of free choice and initiative on the part 
of the R&D performer and the client enterprise 
about what R&D is to be done, by whom, and for 
whom. Instead, the contracts typically are agree- 
ments to carry out tasks in official plans for re- 
search, development and innovation. There is no 
practice of competitive bidding by R&D organiza- 
tions for contracts. Rather, the R&D performer 
and the customer negotiate a mutually acceptable 
agreement within the framework of plan assign- 
ments. 
The contract for a particular project covers the 
technical specifications, the number and types of 
products (formulas, experimental results, technical 
drawings, prototypes, etc.), the “guaranteed eco- 
nomic effect” (when this can be calculated), the 
terms and schedule of compensation, intermediate 
and final deadlines, procedures for approval and 
delivery of completed work, penalties for unsatis- 
factory or late performance, and provisions for 
revising different aspects of the contract [33, pp. 
29-331. 
Section 2 of this study explains the costing of 
applied R&D projects, and section 3 examines 
how prices for them are set in relation to costs so 
determined. Section 4 then analyzes and evaluates 
R&D pricing schemes linked to economic effect 
and intended to motivate R&D organizations to 
produce and deliver on time high quality results 
ready for assimilation into production. 
’ The terms “contract” and “work-order” distinguish the ad- 
ministrative relationship between the R&D performer and 
the customer. However, the two agreements are basically 
similar in content - i.e. in stating the respective responsibili- 
ties of the two parties. 
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2. Costing applied research and development 
services 
Cost calculations for Soviet applied R&D pro- 
jects cover (1) wages, (2) social insurance, (3) 
materials, (4) special equipment, (5) travel, (6) 
payments to subcontractors, and (7) general over- 
head expenditures [33, pp. 51-541. ’ 
The wage component alone is commonly at 
least one-third of the cost of a project of an 
industrial branch R&D organization. Overhead 
expenditures constitute about 30-40 percent of 
total operating expenses of branch R&D units, 
and they are distributed among individual R&D 
projects in proportion to wages [48, p. 351. 
The sum of planned direct and indirect costs of 
an R&D project is its planned “cost of produc- 
tion” that is the basis for the “estimate cost” used 
in pricing the project. If the price is set equal to 
the estimate cost, the latter also is the “value” of 
the project. (Alternative price-cost relationships 
are discussed below in section 3.) 
In Soviet applied R&D, project costs are usu- 
ally estimated through comparisons with previous 
R&D work deemed “analogous”, although there 
is some effort to base cost estimates on formal 
“ norms”. 
2.1. Analog approach 
The analog approach to estimating costs rests 
on the proposition that there are many common 
basic elements found in certain quantitative and 
qualitative relationships in all R&D, and that 
these elements can be identified, analyzed, and 
costed in terms of the kind and amount of labor, 
materials, components, and other inputs involved. 
Under this approach, the R&D organization 
selects from its previous projects one or more that 
are analogous to the new project in purpose, na- 
ture of final result, composition of R&D tasks, 
’ This cost classification does not take into account capital 
investment expenditures for the construction of buildings, for 
the acquisition and installation of multipurpose equipment, 
and for capital repair of buildings and equipment. The failure 
to charge depreciation understates the true cost of R&D 
work and also deprives R&D organizations of a potentially 
important source of financing new capital investment. Thus. 
some Soviet specialists urge the introduction of amortization 
allowances - and at rates much higher than in industry for 
similar kinds of assets, on the ground that obsolescence is 
much faster in R&D than in ordinary production activities 
(39, p. 89; 35. pp. 180-1811. 
use of standard components, etc. Analyzing this 
information, the organization estimates the quanti- 
ties of the various kinds of inputs required for the 
new project, the duration of the work, and its cost. 
Because earlier analogous projects are similar but 
not identical to the new project, adjustments 
(“corrections”) must be made for differences in 
the complexity and originality of the new project 
compared with the analog(s). 
In practice the application of the analog ap- 
proach is limited for two main reasons. One is the 
extent to which the institute’s previous R&D in- 
cludes sufficiently close analogs to the new project. 
When no appropriate analog is identified, the costs 
of the new project are estimated by “direct calcu- 
lation” that starts from figures for average ex- 
penses per average scheduled worker involved. The 
second reason - more important according to 
Soviet specialists - is the lack of sufficiently de- 
tailed information on the cost of each of the 
“basic elements” or “standard tasks” constituting 
the R&D process and incorporated in the analog. 
Thus, use of the analog approach commonly yields 
only approximate cost estimates, often biased up- 
ward for reasons discussed below. 
2.2. Norm approach 
Some Soviet science economists recommend that 
R&D cost estimates be based on formal standard 
cost “norms” (as in industrial production), rather 
than on the extrapolation of the R&D unit’s past 
experience under the analog method [4, pp. 43-58; 
26, pp. 115-1211. The R&D organization would 
use a set of norms for labor, materials, and other 
direct costs per unit of “output” - such as an 
experiment, a group of calculations, a design ele- 
ment, or a set of drawings. In turn the overhead 
norm would be expressed per 1,000 rubles of di- 
rect wages or total direct costs. These norms would 
be calculated from the past experience of various 
R&D organizations over several years, adjusted 
for the expected reduction in input costs per unit 
of output in order to obtain “progressive” norms. 
However, the use of such cost norms in Soviet 
R&D organizations is limited [6, p. 371, and some 
Soviet science specialists doubt that they can be 
applied widely. First, data are lacking on unit 
costs in physical and money terms for the same 
basic elements of R&D in different organizations. 
Second, the originality and uncertainty of R&D 
make it difficult to specify how many times a 
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particular operation, such as a test or drawing, 
should be done until a successful result is obtained 
and the next step in the R&D process undertaken. 
Third, a reasonable norm for a task may vary 
considerably across R&D units because of the 
particular individuals involved, their equipment, 
and the organization and administration of the 
institute or design bureau. Hence, common norms 
for various R&D organizations could be only 
benchmarks not binding limits, or each organiza- 
tion should have its own individual set of norms. ’ 
’ In addition to these general problems of norm-setting, there 
are particular issues in establishing norms for individual cost 
categories. 
R&D organizations often overstate labor requirements and 
wage costs [8, p. 911. These costs are a major component - a 
third to a half - of total costs, Also, materials, travel, and 
some other costs are frequently estimated on the basis of the 
number of workers. Finally, overhead costs are related to 
wage costs. Hence, periodic campaigns press for the reduc- 
tion of labor costs. However, R&D organizations respond, 
for example, by holding down or reducing the average wage 
through an increase in the proportion of less qualified lower- 
wage personnel [28, p. 1371, and total wages by subcontract- 
ing work to other organizations 17, p. 70). 
Norm-setting for materials and equipment is more difficult 
and less developed than for labor. Outlays on materials and 
equipment constituted about 17 percent of total R&D ex- 
penditures (excluding capital investment) in 1976, and the 
share is growing. About 60 percent of these outlays is for 
instruments, laboratory equipment, and measuring devices 
116, pp. 109-110). R&D organizations overstate their require- 
ments for materials and equipment because of their diffi- 
culties in obtaining what they need. “Material-technical 
supply” is a widespread and serious problem in the Soviet 
economy generally, but there are special features in the case 
of R&D. Plans for the supply of materials and equipment to 
R&D organizations are not adequately coordinated with their 
research and financing plans. As a result, supply agencies 
cannot deliver the materials and equipment needed to carry 
out the R&D organizations’ plans. For example, according to 
a Soviet science economist. from 1965 to 1976 total outlays 
on science grew about 150 percent, while the volume of 
“major” types of materials and equipment provided for 
scientific purposes increased only 15-20 percent [15, p. 
lOl].Capital investment plans for science emphasize buildings 
rather than equipment [20, p. 581. R&D organizations have 
more difficulty than industrial enterprises in obtaining sup- 
plies and equipment because a considerable portion of R&D 
organizations’ requirements are for relatively small amounts 
(sometimes only grams or kilograms) of high quality items 
that are hard to estimate accurately 6-12 months in advance, 
when supply orders must be submitted [15, p. 1021. Recogniz- 
ing these problems, R&D organizations try to order larger 
amounts of materials and equipment than they actually need. 
To the extent that they are successful in this attempt, the 
R&D units then have excess stocks of materials [22, p. 1431 
and underutilized equipment 120, p. 741. 
R&D organizations inflate estimate costs for 
two reasons. One is to obtain “insurance” against 
the financial risks from the uncertainty involved in 
R&D [29, p. 144; 21, p. 391. 4 The other is to earn 
a surplus, or profit, to be devoted partly to the 
R&D unit’s funds for individual bonuses and for 
housing and recreational activities and partly to 
the organization’s development fund (for research 
materials, equipment, and facilities) [13, p. 61; 1, 
p. 1871. Both of these reasons can be attributed to 
the absence of satisfactory arrangements for pric- 
ing R&D services with an explicit profit above 
cost [7, p. 721. 
3. Prices for applied research and development 
services 
Soviet methods for pricing R&D services have 
evolved in response to - and can be fully under- 
stood only in the light of - an extensive theoretical 
debate among Soviet science economists. This sec- 
tion first explains the theoretical debate and then 
examines the resulting pricing arrangements. 
3. I. Theoretical debate 
The theoretical debate among Soviet economists 
about the pricing of R&D services involves two 
main questions: (1) Should any R&D have a price 
at all? (2) If so, how should the price be set? 
3.1.1. Should R&D have a price? 
One school of Soviet economists believes that 
R&D should not be assigned a price because it is 
not a “commodity” as this concept is understood 
in Marxian value theory. They argue that R&D 
does not meet all three of the following conditions 
for a “commodity”: (1) A “commodity” must have 
social use value. (2) This value must be measurable 
in terms of “socially necessary labor costs”. (3) 
The good or service must be transferred to the user 
through the process of exchange [53, pp. 43-451. 
(1) In regard to social use value, this school 
holds that R&D is merely a “potential commod- 
ity” and can become an “actual commodity” only 
when it is introduced into production and thus 
4 Another way of reducing risk is to revise cost estimates 
upward during the course of the project. About two-thirds of 
Soviet R&D cost estimates are so “corrected” [51, pp. 83-841. 
“materialized” in industrial output. This view has 
several implications. First, some R&D will never 
be so “materialized”, either because it is unsuc- 
cessful or because, though successful. the R&D is 
not (fully) used by customer enterprises that lack 
the technical capabilities or the economic incen- 
tives to apply it [19, p. 1461. Second, the value and 
price of successful and adopted R&D should he 
measured in the light of the effect from its use in 
production [49, p. 431. Third. the creation of pro- 
totypes might be considered the earliest step in the 
R&D process to involve “material production” 
and thus to qualify as a “commodity” (27, pp. 
26-291. 
(2) “Socially necessary labor costs” (SNLC) are 
the average costs of present labor and past labor 
(embodied in material inputs and the amount of 
fixed assets used up as measured by depreciation) 
in repeated production of a commodity in many 
enterprises over a period of years. This school 
believes that because R&D is supposed to be an 
original. not a repetitive, activity, it is impossible 
to calculate SNLC for R&D and therefore to 
establish the cost norms discussed above [51. p. 
80: 23, p. 1391. 
(3) The transfer (“alienation”) of R&D through 
exchange occurs only when R&D is sold to a 
particular buyer for a specific price. Applied R&D 
under contracts (and work-orders) meets this re- 
quirement, but fundamental research is done for 
and belongs to society as a whole [19, pp. 59-641. 
Another school of Soviet economists - of in- 
creasing influence, to judge by the amount and 
prominence of the publications in which their views 
are expressed - argues that R&D is a “commod- 
ity” and should have a price for this and other 
reasons. They rebut each of the three arguments 
just presented. 
(I) They hold that the socially useful properties 
of R&D are created in the R&D process itself 
and do not depend on the subsequent assimilation 
of R&D into the output of material production. 
Rather, the assimilation stage is considered to 
involve the “consumption” of the useful properties 
of (applied) R&D [39, pp. 25--261. Thus, there is a 
clear parallel, for example, with the activities of 
geological prospecting organizations, whose “out- 
put” in the form of knowledge is classified as a 
“commodity” whether or not the prospecting leads 
to production of minerals [39, p. 221. Finally, this 
school also asserts that only a very small share of 
applied R&D might lack social use value because 
it is unsuccessful. According to studies of Soviet 
specialists. the desired results are obtained in X0-90 
percent of applied research and in 90-95 percent 
of development work [39, pp. 41-421. 
(2) This school also rejects the argument that 
SNLC cannot be calculated for R&D because it is 
nonrepetitive. They estimate the share of thmreti- 
cd research at only lo-12 percent of total outlays 
on science, and at merely 1-3 percent of total 
expenditures in industrial branch research in- 
stitutes and design bureaus. Within upplied R&D, 
they hold, only one-third of the total involves truly 
creative nonr~petitive work with uncertain results. 
while two-thirds has precedents and analogs that 
permit the calculation of SNLC and cost norms. 
However, they suggest that the small. amount of 
unsuccessful R&D be excluded from such calcula- 
tions [39, pp. 29930; 53, pp. 47-48; 19, p. 156; 23, 
p. 1411. Finally, in regard to the truly original, 
nonrepetitive one-third of applied R&D, they 
point out that lack of repetitiveness does not pre- 
vent the calculation of costs and the assignment of 
prices in the case of “unique” special-order 
material products like turbines and machine tools 
[41, p. 641. 
(3) In regard to the “alienation” issue, some 
members of this school argue that all R&D quali- 
fies as a “commodity” because it is created with 
the aim of transferring it to others (rather than 
retaining it in the R&D unit), as shown by the 
organizational and financial separation of R&D 
from material production. This is true for funda- 
mental research financed by the budget and trans- 
ferred to the use of society as a whole, as well as 
for contractual applied R & D for specific 
customers [19, pp. 146-147; 27, pp. 266291. 
However, a less extreme and more common 
view within this school is that applied R&D clearly 
fulfills all three requirements of a “commodity”, 
but that fundamental research - though possessing 
(1) social use vaIue ~ does not pass (2) the SNLC 
and (3) the alienation tests /40, p. 119; 19, p. 154; 
32, pp. 899901. Hence, they consider prices for 
applied R&D appropriate on Marxian theoretical 
grounds. as well as necessary for several practical 
reasons of economic management. 
The first reason is that the operation of an 
organization on an “economic accountability” ba- 
sis should involve the sale of output ~ in this case 
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R&D services - to customers at prices that cover 
costs and provide a profit, some of which is paid 
to the state budget and some of which is retained 
for bonuses, housing and recreational facilities, 
and expansion of production (i.e. R&D) capabili- 
ties [35, p. 182; 19, pp. 164-165; 32, p. 761. Also, 
when R&D organizations are units in scientific- 
production associations, the activities of the R&D 
organizations can be properly compared and ag- 
gregated with those of the producing enterprises 
only if the outputs of both types of member units 
are priced in the same way, i.e. to cover normative 
cost plus a normative profit [23, pp. 14771481. 
Second, prices on R&D can be set so as to 
increase the incentives to the management and 
staff of R&D organizations to choose projects 
with the greatest potential economic effect, to 
complete work with minimum cost on (or ahead 
of) schedule, and to achieve results of a high 
technical quality that are ready for application in 
production [Sl, p. 871. 
Third, the undervaluation of R&D services 
transferred to customers at cost provides an un- 
justified subsidy to research-intensive kinds of 
material production. Instead, applied R & D 
services should, like other nonlabor inputs, have 
explicit prices [18, pp. 17221731. 
3.1.2. How should applied R&D be priced? 
There are two basic proposed approaches (each 
with variants) to the pricing of applied R&D 
services. One approach ~ corresponding to the 
theoretical position that R&D is an “actual” com- 
modity - would set the price equal to planned cost 
plus a profit markup related to all or part of cost. 
The other ~ consistent with the view that R&D is 
only a “potential” commodity - would relate the 
profit markup above cost to the expected or 
achieved effect from the assimilation of R&D into 
production. 
(a) Profit markup related to cost. Under this ap- 
proach profit is deemed to be the value of “sur- 
plus product” created in applied R&D itself, and 
the R&D organization receives the profit upon the 
sale of the R&D (or in part earlier as advance and 
progress payments). 
One variant relates the profit markup to total 
planned cost of production. With P representing 
price; S, planned cost; II, planned profit (or profit 
plus turnover tax); and u, the percentage profit 
markup, P = S + II, and II = as, so that P = S + 
US, or 
P=(l +a)s. (1) 
There is no separate “branch” of applied R&D 
for either organizational or accounting purposes. 
Instead, R&D organizations are classified in the 
branches of the industrial ministries to which they 
belong. Hence, under this variant the profit 
normative a would be based on the planned ratio 
of II to S in the material production of the 
industrial enterprises of the branch. However, this 
ratio would be adjusted upward to allow for the 
greater complexity and difficulty of R&D, com- 
pared to industrial output [23, pp. 143-1451. 
The other variant relates the profit markup only 
to the direct wage component of production cost, 
on the grounds that (present, not past) labor is the 
decisive input in R&D, though not always in 
material production, and that the wage bill often 
constitutes close to half of total cost in R&D, 
compared with 15-25 percent in much of material 
production. With W representing planned wages, 
and b the percentage profit markup, P = S + II, 
and II = b W, yielding 
P=S+bW. (2) 
The profit coefficient b = n/W in R&D should 
exceed the corresponding ratio in material produc- 
tion of the branch, however. Because R&D is 
more creative and more complex than industrial 
production, a ruble of wages is deemed to generate 
more surplus value (whose monetary reflection is 
profit) in the former than in the latter [40, pp. 
121-1221. 
R&D performers prefer a profit markup related 
to the cost, rather than the economic effect, of 
R&D. First, the R&D unit gets the profit for 
adequately completing the project in accordance 
with the conditions of the contract - without any 
dependence on the outcome of the assimilation 
process. Second, the R&D unit can increase profit 
by reducing actual cost below estimated cost. R&D 
performers claim this is an incentive to minimize 
costs [40, pp. 120-1211. 
However, critics of a profit markup related to 
planned cost point out that R&D performers 
would be motivated (1) to inflate estimated cost 
and thus profit as well, and (2) to reduce actual 
cost by lowering the quality of the work. Further, 
these critics argue that R&D performers should 
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have a financial stake in the application of their 
results [Sl, pp. 83-851. 
(b) Profit markup related to economic effect. In 
this approach to pricing R&D the profit compo- 
nent of the price would be a part of the (estimated 
or actual} monetary effect achieved from the suc- 
cessful assimilation of R&D into production, 
which would thus determine the amount of profit 
and the time of its receipt. 
From a theoretical standpoint, economists who 
believe R&D is only a “potential” commodity 
find this approach more acceptable than a profit 
markup related to cost. However, the chief justifi- 
cation is the financial incentive this approach 
creates for R&D units to produce high quality 
results on time and to aid in the assimilation 
process - two parts of the Soviet Government’s 
effort to “link science with production” [17]. 
There are many rather similar variants of for- 
mulas to construct R&D prices with profit related 
to economic effect. The following representative 
formula, proposed by V.A. Pokrovskii, a depart- 
ment head at the USSR State Committee for Sci- 
ence and Technology and a leading Soviet science 
economist, illustrates the essential ideas. As be- 
fore, P, S, and II stand, respectively, for price, 
planned cost, and planned profit. In addition, the 





the share of the potential economic effect 
received by producers (rather than users) of 
the new technology incorporating the R&D; 
the particular R&D organization’s subshare 
of the producers’ share f (the balance of f 
going to the industrial enterprise and any 
other R&D performers); 
the percentage probability that the potential 
economic effect will actually be achieved; 
the potential economic effect. 
Then II = dfgE, so that 
P=SfdjgE. (3) 
Pokrovskii further recommends that coefficients d, 
f, and g be differentiated by industrial branches 
135, pp. 181-1821. 
Advocates of this approach difter on the possi- 
ble sources or components of the “economic ef- 
fect” from the introduction of R&D - and whether 
and how they could be measured. The types of 
economic effect suggested include the following: 
(I) increase in profits due to reduction in current 
and capital costs of production; (2) increase in 
voiume of output; (3) increase in labor productiv- 
ity; (4) improvement in quality; (5) production of 
“fundamentally new” output; and (6) improve- 
ment of working conditions [39, pp. 83-841. In 
addition, one must decide over how many pro- 
ducers and over what time period the economic 
effect will be calculated. 
From the standpoint of the R&D performer. a 
profit markup based on economic effect has 
drawbacks. First, the size of the effect depends 
heavily on the success of producing enterprises in 
assimilating R&D, including their ability to build 
or reconstruct production facilities, to retrain 
workers, to obtain new materials, etc. Second, the 
R&D unit is likely to consider too small the share 
of the economic effect received by it - compared 
with the shares of the producing enterprise (and 
perhaps other R&D performers) and the users, 
Third, the R&D unit would receive its share with 
a considerable lag, since assimilation of R&D into 
mass production commonly takes two or more 
years. During this period, the R&D organization 
would not have the money corresponding to its 
share available for bonuses and other uses. How- 
ever, the last problem could be alleviated by pay- 
ing some of the profit markup as an advance upon 
acceptance of the R&D and the balance when 
assimilation is successfully completed 140, pp. 
120-121; 27, pp. 38-39; 23, pp. 142-1451. 
(c) Profit markup related to both cost and economic 
effect. Citing the advantages and disadvantages 
of the preceding two approaches, some Soviet sci- 
ence specialists recommend a compromise solution 
with profit composed of two components. One 
component, II,, would be related to cost and paid 
upon acceptance of the completed R&D. The 
other component, II,, would be related to the 
economic effect and paid after it is achieved. Let P 
represent price; S, planned cost; d, a percentage 
profit markup smaller than a in formula (I) above: 
f, the share of the economic effect going to pro- 
ducers (R&D performers and enterprises), rather 
than users; a, a subshare of f for the particular 
R&D performer, smaller than d in formula (3) 
above; and E’, the actual, rather than potential, 
economic effect. Then P = S + fl, II= n, + II,, 
Kl, = CiS, and EI, = 2fE’. yielding 
P=(l -+&)Sc~jE’. (4) 
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Under this proposal, the first profit component, 
II,, should be sufficient to make minimum pay- 
ments into the R&D unit’s funds for material 
incentives (individual bonuses), for housing and 
social-cultural measures, and for development of 
the organization’s research capabilities. The sec- 
ond component, III,, would provide additional 
money for these three purposes, as well as money 
for exploratory research, a reserve fund to cover 
losses from unsuccessful work and cost overruns, 
the expansion of working capital, and repayment 
of bank loans for capital investment [19, pp. 
158-159; 32, pp. 91-931. 
3.2. Current practices 
There is no single official methodology for pric- 
ing applied R&D services in the USSR at present. 
Instead, a number of methods are used, based on 
different proposals advanced in the theoretical de- 
bate. This subsection first explains the evolution of 
R&D pricing over the last 20 years. Then it 
examines the information available on the relative 
importance of different pricing schemes. 
The development of R&D pricing in the USSR 
shows a growing acceptance of the inclusion of 
profit in price and the linking of profit to eco- 
nomic effect [ll; 26, pp. 144-1501. 
From the late 1950s when contracting for R&D 
was introduced, through 1967 applied R&D was 
essentially priced at planned cost. However, the 
latter included bonus money, initially amounting 
to 3 percent of the wage fund and amounting in 
1964 to 8-10 percent of it. Payment was by stages, 
terminating with the acceptance of finished R&D 
by the customer. 
With P, C, and S representing, respectively, the 
price, the estimate cost, and the planned cost of 
production, 5 the pricing scheme was P = C and 
C = S, yielding 
P= s. (5) 
Profits in R&D were explicitly recognized in 
the March 22, 1967, Resolution of the USSR 
Council of Ministers, “On Changes in the Method 
of Planning Expenses on Scientific Research Work 
and on Expanding the Rights of Directors of 
’ Soviet costing and pricing practice distinguishes between the 
“cost of production” (sebestoimost’) and the “estimate cost” 
(smetnaia stoimost’). The latter may or may not include a 
profit above the cost of production. 
Scientific Research Institutions”. It gave R&D 
organizations the right to retain 75 percent of the 
excess of planned over actual cost. The remaining 
25 percent was to be paid to the state budget. The 
retained funds could be used to acquire materials 
and equipment to strengthen the organization’s 
research capabilities. Thus, with II’ for actual 
profit, S for planned cost, and S’ for actual cost, 
the result was 
II’ = 0.75( s - S’). (6) 
The next step was to include in the price of 
R&D a profit linked to the expected (“calculated” 
or “guaranteed”) economic effect. This was 
authorized by the September 24, 1968, 
Party-Government Resolution, “On Measures to 
Increase the Effectiveness of Scientific Organiza- 
tions and Speed Utilization in the National Econ- 
omy of Achievements of Science and Technology”. 
The estimate cost could now include a profit equal 
to not more than 1.5 percent of the annual eco- 
nomic effect guaranteed by the R&r D performer to 
the customer, up to a maximum of 6 percent of 
estimate cost, provided that the estimate cost did 
not exceed 50 percent of the guaranteed economic 
effect. Let P, C, S, Il, and E represent, respec- 
tively, the price, the estimate cost, the planned 
production cost, the planned profit, and the 
guaranteed economic effect. Then P = C, C = S + 
II, and II = O.O15E, subject to the restrictions 
0.015E I 0.06C and C I 0.5E. Hence 
P = S + 0.015E (0.015E < O.O6C, C I 0.5E). 
(7) 
In addition, the R&D performer could retain as 
profit 75 percent of the excess of planned cost over 
actual cost. 
For some R&D - such as the creation of new 
items for export and work to improve safety con- 
ditions - it is considered impossible to calculate 
the economic effect. In this instance, the price is 
set equal to planned cost, S, plus a planned profit, 
II, of up to 20 percent of the wage fund of the 
R&D personnel involved, W [49, pp. 46-471. This 
is an application of the proposal in formula (2) 
above, with the restriction that the profit markup 
coefficient b not exceed 0.2. Hence, this pricing 
scheme is 
P=S+bW (b I 0.2). (8) 
Other exceptions involve the output of test 
92 M. Bornstein / R&D sewrces rn the USSR 
facilities and the provision of “production 
services” such as measurements, computing, and 
consultation on assimilation and production prob- 
lems. In both cases, output is priced with a profit 
markup of up to 20 percent on cost [49, pp. 
65-66; 39, pp. 43-471. This is an application of 
the scheme in formula (1) above, with the restric- 
tion that the profit normative a not exceed 0.2. 
Hence 
P = (1 + u)S (a 20.2). (9) 
Advocates of relating profit to economic effect 
regarded the pricing formula in (7) as a step 
forward, but criticized the linking of profit only to 
the expected, rather than the achieved, economic 
effect. This problem is addressed by a pricing 
scheme adopted experimentally first in the USSR 
Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry and 
then in several other ministries. Under this scheme 
the price to the R&D performer includes one 
profit component related to the expected economic 
effect and another profit component linked to the 
actual economic effect. 
Let P stand for the price of R&D; S, its 
planned cost; E, the estimated economic effect; h, 
the R&D performer’s share in E; E’, the actual 
economic effect; and j, the performer’s share in E’. 
Then the price is composed as follows: 
P=S+hE+jE’. (10) 
As explained further in section 4, the economic 
effect is calculated differently for a new process 
that makes it possible to produce the same output 
at lower cost, and for a new product. For the 
former, the effect is the cost saving to the produc- 
ing enterprise(s). For the latter, the effect is the 
combined saving in cost to both producers and 
users of the new product. For a particular new 
technology, either h or j might be zero, making the 
profit component of the price dependent only on 
the actual or the estimated effect. 
Under formula (lo), the R&D unit can still 
obtain additional profits equal to the excess of its 
planned over its actual cost, and retain 75 percent 
of them. 
According to Soviet science specialists, no sta- 
tistics are regularly compiled on the portions of 
total applied R&D priced by the various formulas 
in use, on the distribution of R&D performers’ 
contract revenue among cost and profit, or on the 
shares of the different sources of profit. Instead, 
contemporary accounting in Soviet R&D organi- 
zations concentrates on comparisons of planned 
and actual costs. These comparisons are used for 
the evaluation of (one aspect of) an R&D organi- 
zation’s performance and for the transfer to the 
state budget of 25 percent of the excess of planned 
over actual cost [35, p. 1781. 
To analyze the price structure of R&D, special 
studies of samples of R&D organizations are nec- 
essary, and a few have been reported in the scanty 
Soviet literature on pricing R&D. One study of 25 
R&D units in the Ministry of the Electrical 
Equipment Industry was described by Fatova [ll, 
pp. 70-711, although she did not disclose the kind 
and amount of R&D or the time period covered. 
In these R&D organizations, 89 percent of reve- 
nue went to cover cost, leaving a profit equal to 11 
percent. Of the total profit, 27 percent came from 
funds included in estimate cost (e.g. for profits 
planned in relation to wages or total cost); 55 
percent from the excess of planned over actual 
cost; and only 18 percent from payments linked to 
economic effect. Further, of the profits linked to 
economic effect, 60 percent were based on the 
potential (estimated) effect and only 40 percent on 
the actual effect. 
Broadly similar results were reported by 
Pokrovskii [35, p. 1801 for a separate study of 19 
research institutes in various branches of the econ- 
omy, although he gave no information about which 
branches, the kind and amount of work, or the 
time period. According to this study, the share 
that actual cost absorbed of total revenue ranged 
from 79 to 94 percent, leaving a profit share of 6 
to 21 percent. The difference between planned and 
actual cost was the main source of profit. This 
difference ranged from 3 to 15 percent of total 
revenue, while payments for economic effect pro- 
vided only 2 to 6 percent of total revenue. 
These and other studies, for example [19, pp. 
165-1661, conclude that economic effect payments 
are still a minor source of profit for R&D organi- 
zations. The bulk of their profits comes from the 
excess of planned cost over actual cost, resulting 
chiefly from the overstatement of the former. Also, 
only a minor share of the money for their incen- 
tive funds comes from payments for the actual 
economic effect of their work. 
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4. Incentive aspects of pricing applied research and 
development services 
The pricing of applied research and develop- 
ment services may have negative or positive incen- 
tive effects. As explained above, R&D organiza- 
tions are encouraged to increase planned costs 
when pricing relates profit to planned wages or 
total cost, or to the excess of planned over actual 
cost. In contrast, pricing schemes linked to eco- 
nomic effect seek to motivate R&D organizations 
to deliver on time high quality results ready for 
assimilation into production. The chief mechanism 
for this purpose is payment of part of the eco- 
nomic effect to the R&D organization’s economic 
incentive funds. The R&D performer thus has a 
clear financial stake in the economic effect of its 
work, because this effect influences its revenues 
and rewards to its personnel. 
Subsection 4.1 examines how the economic ef- 
fect is calculated and why the expected effect often 
exceeds the actual effect. Subsection 4.2 explains 
how incentive payments are linked to the eco- 
nomic effect and how these payments are distrib- 
uted among R&D organizations and producing 
enterprises contributing to it. Subsection 4.3 
analyzes the sources and uses of the three eco- 
nomic incentive funds of R&D organizations. 
4. I, Culculation of economic effect 
The current standard methods of calculating 
the economic effect of new technology were estab- 
lished in 1977 by agreement of the USSR State 
Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR 
State Planning Committee, the USSR Academy of 
Sciences, and the USSR State Committee for In- 
ventions and Discoveries [30], replacing a method- 
ology adopted in 1964 [34]. 
The basic formula for the economic effect of a 
new process or method of production that reduces 
the cost of producing the same output may be 
expressed with the following notation: 
E*, 
Cf and C,P, 
annual economic effect from intro- 
duction of a new process or method 
of production; 
producer’s unit operating cost with 
the old (“base”) and new 
processes, respectively; 




producer’s unit capital investment 
with the old and new processes, 
respectively; 
normative coefficient of effective- 
ness of capital (r = 0.15); 
annual volume of output in physi- 
cal units. 
Then the economic effect of the new process is 
determined as the saving in “calculated costs” ~ 
composed of current operating cost and notional 
capital cost (computed specially for this purpose 
but not included in enterprise cost accounts). Thus 
(11) 
The formula for the economic effect of a new 
product, like a machine, that can replace an infe- 
rior existing “base” product selected for compari- 
son is similar in principle but more complicated. 
The following notation will be used: 
Cf and Cj’, 
r, 
Kf and K$, 
0, and O,, 
A, and A,, 
K;' and K;', 
C;l and C,U, 
annual economic effect from the 
production and use of the new 
machine; 
producer’s operating cost per unit 
of the base and new machines, 
respectively; 
normative coefficient of effective- 
ness of capital (r = 0.15); 
producer’s capital investment per 
unit of the base and new ma- 
chines, respectively; 
annual output in physical units 
from one unit of the base and 
new machines, respectively; 
amortization rate (equal to the 
inverse of the service life consid- 
ering obsolescence) for the base 
and new machines, respectively; 
user’s capital investment for the 
base and new machines, respec- 
tively, for the amount of output 
produced with the new machine; 
user’s annual operating cost to 
employ the base and new ma- 
chines, respectively; 
annual quantity of production of 
the new machine in physical units. 
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+ (c;l-CT)-r(K;‘-K,“) 
A,+r 
-(c;+rK;) Q,. 1 (12) 
Thus, the annual economic effect for a new 
product depends on (1) the producer’s “calculated 
costs” of making the base machine, adjusted for 
differences between the old and new machines in 
productivity and in service life allowing for a 
standard return on capital; (2) the user’s saving in 
“calculated costs,” adjusted for the service life of 
the new machine allowing for a standard return on 
capital; (3) the “calculated costs” to the producer 
of making the new machine; and (4) the quantity 
of the new machine produced. (For an example of 
the calculation of & for an actual new machine, see 
[23, pp. 70-721.) 
The application of these formulas for calculat- 
ing the economic effect involves a number of 
problems. They include the choice of the “base” 
process or product, the time period over which the 
effect should be calculated, the volume of output 
assumed, the number of users to be considered, the 
future costs of producers and users, and the degree 
uncertainty 
;;;12;5;24;3I,. 6 
to be acknowledged 
Of particular relevance to this study is the 
common overestimation of the expected economic 
effect compared to the actual (achieved) effect 
calculated according to the same formula. One 
investigation reported by a leading Soviet science 
economist covered 113 R&D projects in 19 re- 
search institutes in different branches, although 
the branches and the time period are not men- 
tioned. The actual effect was less than the planned 
effect for 56 percent of the projects; the two 
effects were approximately equal for 28 percent; 
and the actual effect exceeded the planned effect 
for only 16 percent [35, p. 661. Another survey of 
an unspecified set of Moscow R&D organizations 
found that expected effects were often triple the 
corresponding actual effects [5, p. 511. The most 
common errors are underestimation of the operat- 
ing and capital costs of producers and users of 
new machines, and overestimation of the quantity 
’ Also, the formula for the economic effect of a new product is 
addressed to capital goods and there is no corresponding 
method for assessing the economic effect of a new consumer 
good. 
of new machines to be produced - respectively, 
C$‘, K,P, C,ll, Kt, and Q, in eq. (12) [26, p. 83; 50, 
p. 441. 
There are several types of reasons for the over- 
statement of the expected economic effect. 
First, some calculations of expected effect are 
unintentionally inaccurate. Sometimes correct basic 
data for the various terms in eq. (12) are not used 
in the calculation of the economic effect. They 
may exist but not be available to the R&D organi- 
zation’s economists performing the calculation, or 
they may not be collected at all in the proper form 
(for instance, for user costs for individual 
machines) [42, pp. 977981. Also, the calculation is 
sometimes done by unqualified personnel, or 
without the computer services necessary to handle 
properly the amount of data and computations 
involved [51, pp. 121-1251. In addition, the inher- 
ent uncertainty of R&D is a source of inaccuracy, 
although the extent of error justifiably attributable 
to uncertainty depends on factors such as the 
novelty of the project, the stage of work (research 
uerUS development), and the size of the effect [50, 
pp. 44-461. 
Second, the R&D organization has an incentive 
to overstate the expected economic effect in order 
to undertake more (especially, large and presti- 
gious) projects [50, p. 421 and to receive revenue 
based on the expected effect and included in the 
estimate cost of the project, at least as an advance 
against the actual effect [46, p. 731. 
Third, the actual effect is often less than it 
should be, because producing enterprises fail to 
assimilate R&D into production as quickly and 
thoroughly as they could. At the enterprise, the 
material incentives are stronger for good perfor- 
mance on sales, profit, and other current produc- 
tion indicators than for innovation, which tends to 
conflict with current production [35, pp. 14331451. 
4.2. Incentive puyments linked to economic effect 
For the purpose of linking payments to eco- 
nomic incentive funds of enterprises and R&D 
organizations to the economic effect of new tech- 
nology, Soviet regulations distinguish five cate- 
gories of new technology [36]: 
(1) new process technology whose economic ef- 
fect (E*) occurs in a reduction in production costs 
and is reflected in additional profits to the pro- 
ducer( s); 
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(2) new product technology whose economic 
effect (i?) occurs in the production of new high 
quality products and is reflected in additional 
profits to the producer(s) from surcharges in the 
industrial wholesale prices of the products; 
(3) new technology for complex systems of 
machinery and equipment whose economic effect 
can be measured but is not reflected in additional 
profits to producers from cost reductions or price 
surcharges; 
(4) new technology with a measurable eco- 
nomic effect developed for other ministries; and 
(5) new technology whose economic effect can- 
not be calculated - including technology for pro- 
duction of exports or import-substitutes, for prod- 
uct standards, for environmental protection, for 
improving product reliability, for scientific infor- 
mation, and for management systems. 
In the case of category (1) a portion of the 
additional profits of the producer(s) over a desig- 
nated period - initially two years, now three years 
_ is devoted to incentive payments. The portion 
varies by ministry. For example, it is 15 percent in 
the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry 
and 16.5 percent in the Ministry of Heavy and 
Transport Machine Building [32, p. 1031. 
In the case of category (2) incentive payments 
come from the additional profits of producers due 
to surcharges in the industrial wholesale prices. 
These surcharges make the profitability rate (in 
relation to production cost) of the new products 50 
to 125 percent higher than the standard profitabil- 
ity norm for that category of output. The 
surcharges may be authorized for up to five years 
by the State Committee on Prices. Up to 70 per- 
cent of the additional profit from these surcharges 
can be allocated to incentive payments. The 
ministry and the state budget each receive at least 
15 percent [28, pp. 131-1331. 
The amount of money allocated to incentive 
payments out of additional profits from the price 
surcharge for a particular product is determined 
by a schedule for each ministry that relates the 
amount of incentive payments to the economic 
effect. These schedules are regressive; i.e. incentive 
payments are a smaller percentage of the economic 
effect, the greater the effect [32, p. 1151. 
For categories (3) and (4) the customer makes 
incentive payments in amounts established in spe- 
cial regulations as shares of the annual economic 
effect guaranteed by the organization (and subject 
to adjustment upon acceptance of the completed 
results). 
For category (5), when the economic effect is 
not calculated, incentive payments are instead re- 
lated to the wages of the personnel directly in- 
volved, in amounts up to 20 percent of their wage 
bill. 
The incentive payments for categories (1) and 
(2) are normally made after the additional profits 
are actually earned, while the incentive payments 
for categories (3), (4) and (5) are included in the 
estimate cost of the work. 
When the planned period for the development 
and assimilation of the new technology exceeds 
two years, advances of up to 30 percent can be 
made against expected incentive payments. 
After the amounts to be allocated for incentive 
payments are calculated, 20 percent is taken for 
the ministry’s centralized bonus fund and 80 per- 
cent is shared among the institutes, design bureaus, 
experimental plants, and enterprises contributing 
to the creation and introduction of the new tech- 
nology. 
The ministry’s centralized bonus fund provides 
bonuses for exceptional results in the five cate- 
gories of new technology listed above; for funda- 
mental, theoretical, and exploratory research; and 
for good performance on other aspects of the 
organization’s activities (see subsection 4.3). 
The “decentralized” 80 percent of incentive 
payments linked to the economic effect of a partic- 
ular new technology is supposed to be distributed 
among institutes, design bureaus, and enterprises 
in the light of their respective contributions to this 
effect. The general guidelines for the distribution 
of the decentralized portion distinguish three stages 
in the creation and introduction of new technol- 
ogy: (1) research and development, (2) technologi- 
cal work and preparation for new production, and 
(3) assimilation of new technology in production. 
Formerly, the suggested ranges for the percentage 
shares for these stages were, respectively, 30-50, 
20-25, and 25-40. In 1980, the respective ranges 
were changed to 20-40, 20-40, and 30-50. 
However, such ranges are only very broad 
recommendations. For each project the cooperat- 
ing organizations negotiate their shares, which are 
included in the corresponding work-orders and 
contracts. These shares are supposed to be de- 
termined according to the amount, kind, complex- 
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ity, and creativity of the work of each organiza- 
tion. But there are no generally agreed methods of 
measuring these characteristics in uniform ways 
for all participating organizations [14, pp. 49-501. 
Instead, in practice shares are usually based on the 
organizations’ respective total costs or, more com- 
monly, labor costs for the project [39, p. 84; 3, pp. 
10661071. ’ 
No comprehensive statistics have been pub- 
lished about the shares in total incentive payments 
actually received by organizations at each of the 
three stages. Data for the Ministry of the Electrical 
Equipment Industry in 1978 show that organiza- 
tions in research and development (stage 1) re- 
ceived 22.1 percent of the incentive payments from 
additional profits due to cost reductions from new 
processes and 59.9 percent of the payments from 
additional profits due to price surcharges on new 
products. The combined shares of stages 2 and 3 
(preparation and assimilation) were 77.9 and 40.1 
percent for process and product innovation, re- 
spectively [23, p. 1161. However, these shares for 
the R&D stage for these categories of new tech- 
nology may vary considerably by ministries be- 
cause of differences in the nature of their output 
and in relative labor costs at different stages in the 
research-development-innovation cycle. 
4.3. Sources and uses of economic incentive funds 
The impact on R&D organizations and their 
performance from incentive payments linked to 
economic effect depends both upon the relative 
importance of these payments as a source of mo- 
ney for incentive funds, and also upon the uses of 
these incentive funds. This subsection analyzes the 
sources and uses of each of the three economic 
incentive funds of Soviet applied R&D organiza- 
tions. 
Labor cost is the basis favored by many Soviet specialists on 
the theoretical ground that (current) labor is the chief factor 
in the creation of new technology and on the practical 
ground that most of the material incentive fund, the largest 
of the three economic incentive funds, is usually distributed 
among an organization’s personnel proportionally to wages. 
However, some advocates of labor cost as the basis for 
sharing incentive payments urge that, for such calculations, 
wage bills are imperfect measures of true labor inputs and 
should be adjusted for differences across coperformers in the 
originality, productivity, and other aspects of labor not fully 
reflected in relative wages [2, pp. 94-98; 451. 
4.3.1. Organization Development Fund (ODF) 
There are five sources of money for the ODF 
[36; 32, pp. 114-1161: 
(1) 75 percent of the excess of planned over 
actual costs on contract and work-order projects, 
with the calculation of costs in both cases exclud- 
ing incentive payments included in estimate costs; 
(2) funds included in the estimate costs of pro- 
jects done on contracts or work-orders, in an 
amount equal to 1.5 percent of the guaranteed 
annual economic effect, but not more than 6 per- 
cent of the estimate cost, which cannot exceed 50 
percent of the effect; 
(3) 10 percent of the incentive payments to the 
organization for its share of additional profits 
from price surcharges on new products; 
(4) revenue from the sale of licenses; and 
(5) proceeds from the sale of excess equipment. 
The prescribed uses of the ODF are acquisition 
of equipment and materials, financing capital in- 
vestments, and repayment of State Bank loans for 
investment purposes [32, p. 1171. 
In practice, 75-90 percent of the money accru- 
ing to R&D organizations’ ODFs comes from cost 
savings (source 1 above), which supervising agen- 
cies consider to be due chiefly to the inflation of 
planned cost. Therefore, ministries commonly con- 
fiscate the bulk of the funds accruing to the ODF 
and use them instead for scheduled increases in 
the unit’s working (not fixed) capital. For exam- 
ple, 86 percent of the ODF money in the Ministry 
of the Electrical Equipment Industry in 1975 was 
redirected in this way [26, p. 1601. 
4.3.2. Social-Cultural Measures and Housing Con- 
struction Fund (SCHF) 
The SCHF receives 30 percent of the R&D 
organization’s incentive payments from producers’ 
additional profits from new product technology 
(category 2 in subsection 4.2 above), and 40 per- 
cent of its incentive payments for the other cate- 
gories of new technology [36]. 
The SCHF is used to construct, repair, and 
operate housing, nurseries, clinics, recreational 
facilities, and food service establishments for the 
personnel of the organization. 
4.3.3. Material Incentive Fund (MIF) 
The R&D organization’s MIF receives (1) 60 
percent of the incentive payments for the five 
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categories of new technology (2) payments from 
its ministry’s centralized bonus fund; (3) payments 
from other ministries for work on contracts with 
them; and (4) payments from temporary price 
surcharges on consumer goods, prizes in competi- 
tions, and many other sources [36]. 
ministry. However, in both ministries the com- 
bined shares of payments linked to actual eco- 
nomic effects in the form of additional profits 
from new processes and from new products (the 
first two rows in table 1) were comparatively small 
No comprehensive statistics are published on 
the size of the MIF (or SCHF) in relation to the 
wage fund in R&D organizations. However, in 
1974477 the ratio of the MIF to the wage fund in 
research institutes and design bureaus averaged 
18.7 percent in the Ministry of the Electrical 
Equipment Industry and 16.9 percent in the 
Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Build- 
ing [32, p. 1221. 
_ approximately one-third in electrical equipment 
and one-fourth in power machine building. 8 
Some Soviet specialists consider these per- 
centage relationships reasonable but point to a 
wide variance among R&D organizations around 
the average figures. For example, in the Ministry 
of the Electrical Equipment Industry the ratio in 
1974-1977 ranged from 3 to 30 percent because of 
the kind of work done by the organization and the 
relative importance of different sources of money 
for the MIF [32, p. 1221. 
Thus some Soviet specialists urge raising the 
relative importance of the two sources related to 
economic effect - and perhaps thereby also the 
absolute amount of MIFs - by two changes. One 
is augmentation of the coefficients for the fraction 
of additional profits from new technology devoted 
to incentive payments (see subsection 4.2). The 
other is increasing the share of these payments 
allocated to R&D organizations, and decreasing 
the share for producing enterprises, whose bonus 
funds in any case depend chiefly on performance 
regarding sales, profit, labor productivity, and 
other aspects of current production [23, pp. 
120-1211. 
Only sparse and noncomparable data have been 
published about the shares of different sources in 
the MIFs of R&D organizations. Table 1 presents 
relevant statistics for the Ministry of the Electrical 
Equipment Industry and the Ministry of Power 
Machine Building. In the former ministry, of total 
payments to MIFs of research institutes and de- 
sign bureaus, about a fourth came from the 
ministry’s centralized bonus fund and about a 
third from other sources, whereas these two cate- 
gories were of negligible importance in the latter 
However, the incentive effects of the MIF de- 
pend not only on its size and origins but also on 
its distribution, including the criteria for good 
performance and the extent to which they are 
applied in practice. 
According to official regulations, an R&D 
organization’s MIF can be used for (1) bonuses for 
creation of new technology; (2) bonuses for fulfill- 
ment of the quarterly project plan; (3) bonuses for 
’ The different proportions of the various sources in the two 
ministries may be related to differences in the nature of their 
output - for example, more large production runs in electri- 
cal equipment WXLS more special-order and small batch 
products in power machine building. 
Table 1 
Percentage shares of sources of material incentive funds of research institutes and design bureaus: Ministry of the Electrical 
Equipment Industry, 1979, and Ministry of Power Machine Building, 1978 








Payments from additional profits from cost saving from new processes 
Payments from additional profits from price surcharges on new products 
Payments included in estimate cost 











Source: 146, p. 761. 
98 M. Bornstein / R&D services in the USSR 
fulfillment of “especially important tasks”; (4) 
bonuses for the overall results of the organization 
for the year; (5) bonuses for results in competi- 
tions; (6) bonuses for “other work accomplish- 
ments”; and (7) miscellaneous payments, such as 
vacation allowances for workers in remote loca- 
tions. 
Thus, the extent of the contribution to the 
economic effect of new technology is only one of 
many criteria for the distribution of bonus money. 
This is turn reflects the fact that the economic 
effect of R&D is only one of many indicators by 
which the performance of an R&D organization is 
evaluated by superior agencies, and probably by 
the personnel of the organization itself. Of equal 
or greater importance compared to economic ef- 
fect are two other sets of performance indicators. 
One set involves the fulfillment of the various 
elements of the organization’s plan, including the 
amount of work done; the timeliness of its comple- 
tion; its cost; and the use of the organization’s 
resources of labor, materials, and equipment. The 
second set of indicators concerns the “quality” 
~scientific-technical level”) of the organization’s 
work in terms of originality, theoretical sophistica- 
tion, experimental verification, and other aspects 
[25, ch. 3; 9; 47, ch. 2; 37; 441. 
Thus three kinds of indicators are used in su- 
perior agencies’ evaluation of the R&D organiza- 
tion’s activities. These indicators presumably 
should in turn guide the management of the R&D 
organization in distributing bonuses to its person- 
nel. Official regulations,state that personal bonuses 
should be differentiated by a comparative evalua- 
tion of individual contributions, but there are no 
methodological instructions on how to do so 138, 
p. 1141. The problem is not the lack but rather the 
abundance of ways to evaluate individual contri- 
butions. Over 100 criteria have been proposed by 
Soviet specialists, including the amount of time 
devoted, initiative, creativity, responsibility, 
promptness, and completeness j22, p. 1201. 
In practice, bonuses are often paid to all per- 
sonnel in a uniform proportion to their salaries 
[43, p. 217; 32, p. 1231. A person’s salary in turn 
ordinarily is based on position, scientific degree, 
and length of service, rather than the importance, 
quantity, and quality of current work. Hence, 
bonuses tend to be regarded, by the management 
and the personnel of the R&D organization, as a 
proportional supplement to basic salary rather than 
a differentiated reward for better work (26, pp. 
199-2011. 
5. Conclusions 
The proper relationship of price to cost for 
R&D services has been the subject of an extended 
debate among Soviet science economists. The 
evolution of pricing of applied R&D over the last 
20 years shows a growing acceptance of the incfu- 
sion of profit in price and the linking of profit to 
economic effect. 
In principle the linking of incentive payments 
to R&D organizations to the economic effect of 
their work creates incentives for timely delivery of 
high quality results suitable for assimilation into 
production. 9 However, the strength of these 
incentives is in practice diluted (1) by the relation 
of a large part of incentive payments not to the 
actual but to the (often inflated) expected effect; 
(2) by the size of the coefficients for the portion of 
the effect devoted to incentive payments; (3) by 
the distribution of total incentive payments be- 
tween the ministry and the organizations contrib- 
uting to the effect, and among these organizations; 
and (4) by the relative importance of different 
sources and uses of R&D units’ economic incen- 
tive funds. 
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